On June 17, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Dillon v. United States. In a 7-1 opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor (Justice Samuel Alito did not participate in the case and Justice John Paul Stevens dissented), the Court held that United States v. Booker, which made the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines advisory, does not apply when a person seeks a reduced sentence based on a guideline amendment that has been made retroactive by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
The Sentencing Reform Act gave the Sentencing Commission authority both to lower guideline sentences and to make such lower sentences retroactive. This means some prisoners serving sentences under the old guideline can benefit because courts can modify their old sentence to reflect the new lower sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) instructs the court to consider motions for sentence reductions in the case of retroactive guidelines by determining whether the reduction is consistent with policy statements of the Commission and federal sentencing law. When the U.S. Sentencing Commission amends the sentencing guidelines and makes an amendment retroactive, that amendment is listed with other retroactive amendments in the policy statement at § 1B1.10 of the federal sentencing guidelines. Defendants who may benefit from the retroactive amendment must file a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the court in which they were sentenced to get the benefit of the amendment.
In November 2007, the Commission passed the so-called “crack minus two” amendment, which reduced crack sentences by two base offense levels. On December 11, 2007, the Commission announced that the change would be made retroactive. This meant the new, lower crack guideline could be used to lower the sentences of people who had been sentenced for crack cocaine before March 3, 2008. The Commission also amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the policy statement courts use when considering whether to apply a lower guideline retroactively, to underscore its intention that a court only apply the new guideline range and leave the sentence otherwise untouched. The new policy statement was reinforced to limit courts to applying only the retroactive amendment (the two-level reduction authorized by the crack amendment) during proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The Commission did this because it wanted to control the extent of sentence modifications under the new advisory guideline system.
Dillon had been sentenced in 1993, well before the guidelines were advisory. His sentence (part of which was for crack cocaine distribution) was, according to the sentencing judge at the time of sentencing, nearly 18 years longer than he deserved. The sentencing judge called the sentence “entirely too high,” but also explained that he was forced to apply the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. Had Dillon faced the same judge using advisory guidelines, he would have received only a five-year sentence. In 2008, Dillon asked the court to reduce his sentence under the retroactive “crack minus two” guideline amendment, but also asked the court to go further and resentence him under the now advisory guidelines. Dillon argued that Booker, which made the sentencing guidelines advisory, made all of the guidelines advisory, including § 1B1.10. Thus, judges, Dillon said, should not have to follow the limits set in § 1B1.10 and could do a full resentencing when applying a retroactive guideline amendment. In other words, because of Booker, Dillon urged, courts could give defendants the two-level crack sentence reduction and reduce sentences even more, using the now-advisory guidelines, during a proceeding under § 3582(c)(2).
While the sentencing court reduced Dillon’s sentence by two levels (resulting in a sentence reduction of over four years), it, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and, on June 17, the Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with Dillon’s argument that he deserved a full resentencing under the advisory guidelines. The Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) narrowly, holding that it does not permit courts to do full resentencings. That statute only permits courts to modify sentences based on guideline amendments made retroactive by the Commission and only by following the Commission’s rules. Congress, the Court said, entrusted the Commission to decide which amendments would be made retroactive and how much those amendments could reduce sentences. Additionally, because there is no constitutional right to have a retroactive guideline amendment applied to one’s case, motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) do not trigger the same constitutional concerns that sentencing hearings do. In short, because § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are different than sentencing hearings, and because Congress gave the Commission the authority to define the terms of the reductions, Booker does not apply to them, and courts must follow the Commission’s limits in § 1B1.10 of the guidelines when applying retroactive amendments.
Prisoners and their families should be aware that the opinion in Dillon does not reduce any prison sentences. Those with questions about Dillon or their pending motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) should talk with their attorneys.
You can read more about Percy Dillon’s case in FAMM’s amicus brief recently filed in the cases of Abbott v. United States and Gould v. United States. Read the full opinion here.